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PAYING PHYSICIANS MORE TO DO LESS: FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES TO LIMIT CARE*
David Orentlicher**
I. INTRODUCTION
As the explosion in health care costs has led to serious ef-
forts at cost containment, concerns have been raised that some
of the methods used to contain costs may cause more harm
than good. In particular, many commentators have criticized the
practice of giving physicians personal financial incentives to
limit the provision of care to their patients. These critics have
argued that, if physicians are paid more to do less, patients will
suffer harm from undertreated illness, and patient trust in the
patient-physician relationship will be seriously compromised.
Accordingly, it is argued, financial incentives for physicians to
limit care should not be used' and should even be prohibited.2
* This article expands substantially on some ideas presented earlier in David
Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Threat to the Patient-Physician Relationship,
5 HEALTH MATRmIX 141 (1995) and David Orentlicher, Managed Care and the Threat
to the Patient-Physician Relationship, 10 TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE, L. & ETHics 19
(1995). I am grateful for the comments of Judy Failer and Peter Hammer, and the
research assistance of Lakshmi Reddy. I am also grateful to the American Medical
Association and the Indiana University School of Law-Indiapolis for their support of
this research. I would also like to thank Harris Kay and the staff of the University
of Richmond Law Review.
** Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis;
Adjunct Associate Professor of Medicine, Indiana University School of Medicine; Ad-
junct Assistant Professor of Medicine, Northwestern University Medical School; AB.,
1977, Brandeis University; M.D., 1981, J.D., 1986, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., David M. Frankford, Managing Medical Clinicians' Work Through the
Use of Financial Incentives, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1994); Daniel P. Sulmasy,
Physicians, Cost Control, and Ethics, 116 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 920, 924 (1992); Su-
san M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics, 24(2) HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 28, 37 (1994). But see Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bed-
side, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 758-776 (1994) (arguing in favor of properly crafted fi-
nancial incentives that are disclosed to patients).
2. David Mechanic, Professional Judgment and the Rationing of Medical Care,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1713, 1748 (1992).
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In this article, I will argue that the opposition to financial
incentives is ultimately misguided, that it gives insufficient
weight to the benefits of financial incentives and to the broader
context in which financial incentives are used. While personal
financial incentives to limit care raise important ethical con-
cerns, they also have important benefits for cost containment
that alternative methods do not have. Moreover, the alternative
methods are either insufficiently effective or raise their own
equally troubling concerns. Accordingly, while the government
should place limits on the extent to which financial incentives
can be used, it should not prohibit the incentives entirely.
II. THE NEED TO LIMIT HEALTH CARE COSTS
With health care costs continuing to rise, it has become in-
creasingly clear that we cannot afford all medically beneficial
care.' Advances in technology are pushing health care costs to
an unsustainable level 4-spending on health care has reached
nearly fourteen percent of this country's Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).5 Some savings can be achieved by eliminating
waste in the health care system-there are too many hospital
beds, radiologic scanners and other medical equipment and
facilities in the United States,6 and there is considerable in-
efficiency in administrative activities.7 However, elimination of
waste would not free up enough resources to cover all poten-
tially useful medical services.8 Moreover, the public has a host
3. Indeed, we have probably never provided all potentially beneficial medical
care. For example, the high cost of MRI scans has meant that some patients with de-
tectable cancers do not undergo scanning because of the very low probability that
they have a cancer.
4. William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Containment
Strategies: Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA 220, 221 (1987).
5. TIMOTHY J. HAUSER & JAMES D. JAMESON, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S.
INDuSTRIAL OUTLOOK, 1993, at 42-1 (1993).
6. Victor R. Fuchs, No Pain, No Gain: Perspectives on Cost Containment, 269
JAMA 631, 631-32 (1993).
7. David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Cost Without Benefit: Admin-
istrative Waste in U.S. Health Care, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 441, 443 (1986); Steffie
Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The Deteriorating Administrative Efficiency of
the U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1253 (1991).
8. Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Ethics, Institutional Complexity and
Health Care Reform: The Struggle for Normative Balance, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
POLly 93, 95 (1994).
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of welfare needs, such as better housing, education, and envi-
ronmental protection, but has a limited purse. If we are to have
any money left to pay for these other goods, then we must limit
how much we spend on health care services.' A significant
amount of marginally beneficial care can no longer be provided.
Some observers have questioned whether the public has actu-
ally consented to the implementation of cost containment mea-
sures. It is true that, other than in Oregon where there was
broad public input into the development of the Oregon Health
Plan's prioritization of health care services, ° there has not
been a formal public discussion and referendum on health care
rationing." Nevertheless, the public is very much voting with
its pocketbook in favor of cost containment.'2 Participation in
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), which typically
charge lower premiums than traditional indemnity health
plans,13 has been increasing rapidly in the past few years, and
experts project continued rapid growth in the coming years.
Some twenty percent of Americans are enrolled in HMOs, and
it is estimated that HMO enrollment will increase ten to fifteen
percent annually over the next few years." Enrollment in ei-
ther an HMO or a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO)"5
9. This statement is true whether we are talking about publicly or privately
funded health care. Both governments and individuals have limited budgets.
10. Norman Daniels, Is the Oregon Rationing Plan Fair?, 265 JAMA 2232, 2234
(1991).
11. Some commentators distinguish, on the one hand, between the elimination of
care when marginal costs exceed marginal benefits, and, on the other hand, decisions
to deny care when marginal benefits exceed marginal costs, but net marginal benefits
are not as great as for care provided to other patients. The meaningfulness of this
distinction is not clear given the difficulty of comparing benefits and costs of health
care. For example, does extending life for a day at a cost of $10,000 have greater
marginal benefits or costs? In any case, the distinction is not significant for purposes
of this article.
12. See Ira Mark Ellman & Mark A. Hall, Redefining the Terms of Health Insur-
ance to Accommodate Varying Consumer Risk Preferences, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 187,
188 (1994).
13. HMOs are health care plans that provide a comprehensive package of health
care benefits, generally for a fixed, prepaid premium. Traditional indemnity plans
provide reimbursement for health care services, but do not actually provide the care
themselves, and subscribers are subject to deductibles and co-payments when they
obtain covered services. DAVID E. VOGEL, AM. MED. ASS'N, DOCTORS RESOURCE SER-
VICE: THE PHYSICIAN AND MANAGED CARE 5 (1993).
14. PRIVATE SECTOR ADVOCACY AND SUPPORT TEAM, AM. MED. ASS'N, MANAGED
CARE AND THE MARKET: A SUMMARY OF NATIONAL TRENDS AFFECTING PHYSICIANS 2
(2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter MANAGED CARE AND THE MARKET].
15. The term Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) refers to a health care plan
1996]
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now totals about forty percent of the population. 6 In any
event, this article is not about the government forcing people
into lower cost health plans. Rather, it is about the extent to
which health care plans can take measures that will reduce
costs and make their insurance available at lower premiums to
those individuals who are willing to sacrifice some marginally
beneficial medical care.
III. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO LIMIT CARE
A. Types of Financial Incentives to Limit Care
Because the traditional fee-for-service method of reimbursing
physicians for their services is believed to have encouraged
overutilization of medical services, health care plans have in-
creasingly turned to alternative methods of compensation that
eliminate the incentive for physicians to provide high levels of
care. With fee-for-service care, physicians receive reimburse-
ment for each service they actually provide. The more services
that are provided, the greater the physician's income. Accord-
ingly, additional care may serve the personal interests of phy-
sicians even when the benefits of the care may not be great
enough to justify its costs.
The two primary alternatives to fee-for-service care are capi-
tation and salary. 7 With capitation, the physician assumes
responsibility for the care of a number of patients and is paid a
fixed amount of money for each patient. While capitation and
salary in principle are interchangeable-they both result in
physicians being paid a fixed level of compensation no matter
how many or how few services they provide-the two forms of
payment tend to be used differently. Salaries are more common
in which the insurer enters into contracts with physicians, hospitals, and other health
care providers to provide services to the plan's members. These "preferred" providers
agree to discounted payments, utilization review, approval by the plan for non-emer-
gency admissions to the hospital, and other concessions in return for their being
listed as a covered provider under the plan's terms. If subscribers use non-listed
providers, then they receive only partial coverage for the costs of their care. VOGEL,
supra note 13, at 5.
16. MANAGED CARE AND THE MARKET, supra note 14, at 2.
17. Even with the growth of managed care, the majority of physician revenues
continue to be earned on a fee-for-service basis. Id. at 6.
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in HMOs, which often employ a full-time staff of physicians 8
or contract with a group or groups of physicians 9 to provide
medical services to the HMOs' subscribers on a full-time basis,
while capitation is more typical with health care plans that
contract for only part of a physician's time. For example, a
particular physician may serve patients from several different
health plans, and receive capitation fees from each plan.
Whether paid by salary or capitation, physicians earn the same
amount of money no matter how many services they provide
their patients and have no incentive to provide excessive servic-
es. Rather, they have a personal incentive to limit the services
that they provide. The fewer appointments they schedule and
the less time they spend with patients during each appoint-
ment, the more time they have available for alternative activi-
ties like consulting, research, or leisure.
There is one important difference between salary and capita-
tion with regard to a physician's personal incentives. With capi-
tation, physicians have an incentive to increase the number of
patients for whom they have responsibility while, with salary,
physicians have an incentive to reduce the number of patients
for whom they have responsibility. Accordingly, salaried physi-
cians are often assigned a certain number of patients for whom
they are expected to provide care.
Even with their built-in incentive to limit care, pure salary
and capitation may not provide sufficient incentive for physi-
cians to limit the costs of care provided to their patients. Phy-
sicians rely on a bundle of medical services to care for their
patients, and this bundle includes the physician's own time
with the patient, diagnostic tests or procedures," referrals to
other physicians with different or more specialized expertise,
and other ancillary services. When physicians receive a fixed
amount of compensation for their own time, they have an in-
centive to alter the mix of services provided to their patients, to
18. HMOs that employ their own physicians are known as "staff model HMOs."
VOGEL, supra note 13, at 11.
19. HMOs that contract with a group or groups of physicians are known as
"group model HMOs." The Kaiser Permanente HMOs operate as group model HMOs.
Id. at 11-12.
20. The category of diagnostic tests and procedures includes blood tests, x-rays,
other radiologic tests like CT and MRI scans, and biopsies.
1996]
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rely less on their own direct services and rely more on diagnos-
tic tests, referrals and other ancillary services. As a result, even
though the costs to the health plan of the physician's services
are contained, the costs of all services provided to patients may
nevertheless rise. The costs of overall services may also rise
because physicians have other incentives to increase their use
of ancillary services. The desire to minimize uncertainty about
the patient's diagnosis and prognosis or to reduce the risk of
professional liability also can result in physicians overusing
diagnostic tests, referrals, and other medical services.
To restrain physicians from overusing ancillary services,
health care plans typically rely on bonuses, fee withholds, or
expanded capitation. In a bonus arrangement, health care plans
set aside a pool of funds to pay for ancillary services. If at the
end of the year, there are unspent funds in the pool, the resid-
ual funds are used to pay for bonuses to the physicians in the
health care plan. Accordingly, the physicians recognize that
they can increase their compensation by reducing their use of
ancillary services. Fee withholds work similarly. In a fee with-
hold arrangement, the health care plan deducts a percentage of
the physicians' compensation at each pay period and uses the
withheld compensation to fund a pool for ancillary services. If,
at the end of the year, there are unspent funds in the pool, the
residual funds are returned to the physicians. With expanded
capitation, a physician's capitation payments are designed to
cover not only the physician's own services for the physician's
patients but also some or all of the ancillary services provided
to the patients.21 If the physician refers a patient to another
physician or orders a laboratory test, the cost of the referral or
test comes out of the physician's income. In short, financial
incentives to limit care discourage physicians from providing
high levels of care by transferring from the health plan to the
physician some of the financial risk of costly medical care.
21. Ken Terry, HMO Deals That Give You More Money for More Risk, MED.
ECON., Dec. 26, 1994, at 30, 30-31.
160
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B. Virtues and Dangers of Financial Incentives to Limit Care
1. Dangers of Financial Incentives
Commentators have sharply criticized the use of financial
incentives to limit care." The most troubling aspect is the risk
to patient welfare. If physicians have a personal economic inter-
est in limiting the care they provide their patients, they may
delay important tests and treatment or omit the tests and
treatment entirely. They may schedule patients for return ap-
pointments at intervals between appointments that are too
long, or they may try to manage their patients' care too long,
unduly stretching the limits of their own expertise, before refer-
ring the patients to an appropriate specialist.23 Physicians may
also accelerate the date of a patient's discharge from the hospi-
tal after surgery, increasing the risk that a complication of the
surgery will develop at home where appropriate care may not
be available quickly enough.24
Even if there is no actual harm to the patient, there may be
serious harm to the patient-physician relationship. Historically,
physicians have assumed a fiduciary role on behalf of their
patients, assuring patients that they will act primarily as ad-
vocates for the patient's interests.25 This fiduciary role is a
natural result of the condition of the patient and the role of the
physician. Patients are especially needy when they are sick,
with their health, and indeed their life, often hanging in the
22. See, e.g., Ruth Macklin, The Ethics of Managed Care, 10 TRENDS IN HEALTH
CARE L. & ETHIcs 63, 63-64 (1995); Sulmasy, supra note 1, at 921-23; Wolf, supra
note 1, at 37; Steffie Woolhandler and David U. Hummelstein, Extreme Risk-The
New Corporate Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706 (1995).
23. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. PoLr 23, 31 (1986). For example, an internist
might not consult a cardiologist soon enough to help a patient properly with coronary
artery disease.
24. Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Prospective Payment System and Impairment at Dis-
charge: The "Quicker-and-Sicker" Story Revisited, 264 JAMA 1980 (1990) (studying
17,000 patients in 300 hospitals in five states and finding that when Medicare
switched to a prospective payment system in which hospitals were paid a fixed fee
for each patient rather than being reimbursed based on the patient's actual costs of
care, patients were discharged sooner and in less stable condition).
25. Robert M. Veatch, Physicians and Cost Containment: The Ethical Conflict, 30
JURImETRICS J. 461, 469-70 (1990).
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balance. At the same time, they are especially dependent on
their physicians, who possess not only a virtual monopoly on
the expertise to treat illness but also a virtual monopoly on the
use of medical therapies. With so much at stake for the
patient's welfare and so much power in the hands of physicians,
patients will not be willing to rely on their physicians' judg-
ment unless they can trust that physicians will use their power
and authority on behalf of their patients, placing their patients'
interests above all other interests. However, when physicians
are paid more to do less for their patients, patient trust in
physicians will naturally be eroded as patients begin to wonder
whether tests and treatments are being withheld because they
are not medically indicated or because physicians have a finan-
cial interest in denying the care.
Given the dangers of financial incentives, the federal govern-
ment has enacted legislation that restricts the use of financial
incentives by health care plans that provide care to Medicare or
Medicaid recipients. Health care plans may not make "specific"
payments "directly or indirectly" to physicians "as an induce-
ment to reduce or limit medically necessary services."26 Fur-
ther, if a health plan places physicians "at substantial financial
risk" with financial incentives," the plan must provide "stop-
loss protection"28 for the physicians at a level that is "based on
standards developed by the Secretary" of Health and Human
Services. This legislation was originally enacted in 1986 and
amended in 1990.2 Proposed rules were published in Decem-
ber 1992,30 and final rules were issued in March 1996."'
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(i) (1994).
27. Under the statute, substantial financial risk is to be defined by the Secretary
of the Health and Human Services. Id. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(ii).
28. Stop-loss protection or insurance refers to an arrangement by which a health
care plan places a limit on the amount of risk borne by its physicians. For example,
in an expanded capitation plan in which the capitation payments are designed to
cover all patient costs, physicians might only be responsible for patient costs up to a
maximum of $5,000 or $10,000 for any one patient. Terry, supra note 21, at 37.
There might also be a cap on the total amount of costs for which the physicians are
responsible. ALLEN J. SORBO, DOCTORS RESOURCE SERVICE: COMPENSATION ARRANGE-
MENTS IN MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS 5-7 (American Medical Association 1993).
29. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans
in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,024, at 59,025 (1992) (to be
codified at,42 C.F.R. pt. 417, 42 C.F.R. pt. 434 & 42 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (proposed Dec.
14, 1992).
30. Id. at 59,034-40.
31. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans
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FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO LIMIT CARE
Under the rules, capitation payments, bonuses and fee with-
holds would not be considered "specific" payments made "as an
inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary services,"
and so would not be prohibited." However, through the re-
quirement of stop-loss protection3 when physicians are at
"substantial financial risk,"' there would be -restrictions on the
amount of financial risk that could be shifted to physicians.35
Substantial financial risk would exist when financial incentives
place more than twenty-five percent of a physician's income at
risk, but only if the incentives are based on a patient panel size
of 25,000 or fewer patients." When incentives are based on a
patient panel size of more than 25,000 patients, there would
not be any limit on the level of financial incentives that could
be used.37 In cases of substantial financial risk, stop-loss pro-
tection would have to be provided on either an aggregate or
per-patient basis.3" If aggregate stop-loss protection is provid-
ed, then it must cover ninety percent of the losses beyond the
twenty-five percent of income placed at risk. 9 If stop-loss pro-
tection is provided on a per-patient basis, then the level of pro-
tection would depend on the size of the patient pool, with great-
in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,430-13,450 (1996) (to be codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pt. 417, 42 C.F.R. pt. 434 & 42 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (issued Mar. 27,
1996).
32. Id. at 13,446-48.
33. Stop-loss protection refers to measures designed to limit the physician's over-
all financial risk.
34. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans
in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,430, at 13,447-48.
35. The plan would also have to conduct periodic surveys of subscribers "to de-
termine the[ir] degree of access" and "satisfaction with the quality of services." 42
U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(ii)(Il) (1994); see also Medicare and Medicaid Programs;
Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 61
Fed. Reg. 13,430, at 13,447.
36. The 25,000 patient threshold was chosen by HCFA because a study of health
care costs found that patient costs did not vary significantly from year to year in
counties that had populations greater than 25,000. Medicare and Medicaid Programs;
Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 61
Fed. Reg. 13,430, at 13,437. Accordingly, HCFA concluded that "physician groups with
more than 25,000 patients are able to adequately spread risk and, therefore, are not
at substantial financial risk, even if 100 percent of the physician group's income is at
risk for referral services." IdJ
37. Id. This assumes that the patient panel does not exceed 25,000 as a result of
pooling patients. Id. at 13,447.
38. Id
39. Id. at 13,440.
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er protection required for smaller patient pools, and the stop-
loss protection still covering ninety percent of losses above the
per-patient limit.4" As these details indicate, there would be no
absolute limit on the level of risk sharing.4' If these rules
seem complicated, it is because they are complicated.
2. Virtues of Financial Incentives
While the dangers of financial incentives are very real, there
are also very important benefits to using these incentives to
limit health care costs. There are two primary advantages of
financial incentives. First, their use ensures that the persons
who ultimately must be responsible for cost contain-
ment-physicians-have sufficient incentive to pursue cost con-
tainment. Second, financial incentives preserve the ability of
physicians to individualize the care they provide their patients.
a. Ensuring Sufficient Incentive to Contain Costs
With financial incentives to limit care, health care plans
effectively shift part of the risk of excessive health care costs to
physicians. If health care costs are high, then the physicians
will suffer a reduction in their compensation. Their bonuses will
be smaller, less of their fee withholds will be returned, or less
of their capitation fees will be left as income after expenses.
While this shifting of risk poses dangers to patient welfare, it
also ensures that physicians have sufficient incentive to re-
strain health care costs.
It is critical to give physicians sufficient incentive to pursue
cost containment because they ultimately must assume much of
the responsibility for necessary cost containment. It simply will
not be possible to hold health care costs to a manageable level
unless physicians begin to make cost considerations an integral
part of their decision-making. To be sure, physicians have al-
ways considered financial costs to some extent when making
medical decisions. For example, when deciding whether to offer
a particular treatment to a patient, physicians have always had
40. Id. at 13, 448.
41. This is a change from the proposed rules. Id. at 13, 440.
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to consider not only whether the treatment's benefits exceeded
its risks but also whether there was an alternative treatment
that provided the same net benefits at lower cost. Now, howev-
er, physicians must also consider whether the benefits to the
patient from a particular treatment are great enough to justify
the treatment's costs when there are other patients in need of
treatment and not enough resources to provide every patient all
medically beneficial care.
The reason why it is necessary for physicians to become re-
sponsible for cost containment is not because they are well-
suited for that role. Indeed, they are not well-suited to serve as
rationers of medical care. The argument for vesting physicians
with responsibility for cost containment is that the alternatives
are even worse. First, I will discuss why physicians are poorly
suited for this rationing role. Then, I will discuss why they are
still better suited than anyone else.
There are several reasons why physicians should not serve as
rationers of medical care. First, physicians cannot possibly as-
similate all of the information needed to make rationing deci-
sions. When deciding whether to offer a patient a particular
treatment, physicians would need to know not only how much
benefit the patient might receive from treatment, how likely it
would be that the benefit would be realized, and how much it
would cost for the treatment, but also what other benefits
would be realized if the funds that would be used to pay for
the treatment were used instead for other patients. Second,
there would be a great deal of inconsistency from physician to
physician. Some physicians would err in favor of conserving
society's limited resources; others would err in favor of treating
the patient before them.42 Whether a patient will be treated,
then, may turn more on the personal views of the patient's
physician than on any overarching rationing principles.' Like
42. Sulmasy, supra note 1, at 921.
43. Even before rationing became a serious concern, physicians varied widely in
their use of certain procedures. One study demonstrated that patients in Boston were
much more likely to be hospitalized than similar patients in New Haven. John E.
Wennberg et al., Are Hospital Services Rationed in New Haven or Over-Utilized in
Boston?, THE LANCET, (May 23, 1987, at 1185) (comparing use and costs of hospital
services over a one-year period for a substantial majority of hospital admissions in
Boston and New Haven). Another study found that some physicians at one hospital
were twice as likely as their colleagues to perform cesarean section, even after con-
1651996]
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litigants who engage in forum shopping to find the most favor-
able law for their case, patients would engage in clinic shopping
to find the physicians most likely to favor their needs over the
needs of other patients. Third, physicians have no special exper-
tise in making rationing decisions. These are value judgments
about the proper use of medical resources that laypersons are
as qualified as physicians to make." Whether permanently
unconscious patients should be treated with ventilators is a
question that can be settled not by medical principles but by
broader philosophical or political considerations about the ap-
propriate allocation of limited resources.45 Fourth, it is not on-
trolling for differences among the patients. George L. Goyert et al., The Physician
Factor in Cesarean Birth Rates, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 706 (1989) (studying prospec-
tively all deliveries over a 12-month period at a community hospital that handled
deliveries only for insured women who were at "very low risk" for obstetrical compli-
cations).
Studies on the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from irreversibly ill pa-
tients also show that the personal views of physicians are a better predictor of pa-
tient care than are any overarching principles about end-of-life care. David
Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101
(1992); David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 1280-
301 (1994).
44. Consider the following example that illustrates how medical judgments are
really no different in kind than other value judgments. As a general rule in medicine,
obstetricians offer amniocentesis to check for Down syndrome in pregnant women
without a family history of Down syndrome only if the women are at least 35 years
old. Joe Leigh Simpson, Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Diagnosis, in OBSTETRICS:
NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 269, 278 (Steven G. Gabbe et al., eds. 2d ed.
1991). This general rule reflects, in part, the fact that, when the woman is age 35 or
over, the risk that the fetus will suffer from Down syndrome is equal to or greater
than the risk that the amniocentesis will inadvertently abort the fetus. Susan P.
Pauker & Stephen G. Pauker, Prenatal Diagnosis-Why Is 35 a Magic Number?, 330
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1151 (1994). In other words, the medical community has conclud-
ed that women should be offered amniocentesis only when the risk of the fetus being
afflicted with Down syndrome equals or exceeds the risk of aborting a normal fetus.
Now, this may be a reasonable balance to draw, but it is also the case that many
women may have very strong feelings about not having a child with Down syndrome
and may therefore want to undergo amniocentesis unless the risk of an abortion is
five, ten or even twenty times that of the risk of a Down syndrome fetus. These
women might reason that they can always try to become pregnant again, but they
cannot undo the birth of a child with Down syndrome. In short, reasonable people
can differ on the appropriate place to draw the balance, and there is nothing about
medical expertise that helps us settle the question.
45. Compare Marcia Angell, The Case of Helga Wanglie: A New Kind of 'Right to
Die' Case, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 511 (1991) (supporting the use of ventilators for
patients in a permanently unconscious state) with Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand
for 'Non-beneficial' Medical Treatment, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 512 (1991) (opposing
the use of ventilators for patients in a permanently unconscious state).
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ly the case that physicians lack the expertise and the authority
to make rationing decisions, it is also the case that acting as
rationers creates for physicians a serious conflict of interest
between the needs of their own patients and the needs of other
patients. As a result, if physicians become responsible for ra-
tioning decisions, patients may become increasingly distrustful
of their physicians. Patient trust may be eroded as individuals
wonder whether they are receiving all necessary treatment or
whether their physician is withholding some care because of the
needs of other patients. For all of these reasons, it has been the
traditional view in medical ethics that physicians must not
have responsibility for making rationing decisions when treating
their patients." Under this view, physicians can implement
rationing decisions made by someone else, but they cannot
make rationing decisions by themselves at the bedside. Thus,
the traditional view calls for special committees or panels to
establish rationing guidelines for physicians to follow when
making medical decisions.47
While the arguments against physician as rationer are very
strong, they ultimately are inadequate to overcome the argu-
ments in favor of physicians' responsibility for rationing deci-
sions. There are two important challenges to the traditional
view that physicians should not serve as bedside rationers of
health care. First, it is not clear that this is really what pa-
tients want. While patients may want their physicians to do
"everything" once they are sick, they may have very different
preferences before they become ill. In advance, patients may
prefer that their physicians act as wise stewards of health care
resources, balancing individual patient needs with the needs of
other patients, so that resources will be available when they
are truly needed.' There is considerable merit to this view;
however, it does not require that physicians act as rationers of
46. Robert M. Veatch, DRGs and the Ethical Allocation of Resources, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., June 1986, at 32, 37-39; Norman G. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573 (1984). But see Hall, supra note 1, at 727-758 (rejecting the
traditional view).
47. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical
Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 330-35 (1995); Veatch, supra note 24, at
479-80.
48. Paul T. Menzel, Some Ethical Costs of Rationing, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
57 (1992).
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health care. It requires that health care resources be rationed
wisely, but it leaves open the question of who should be respon-
sible for making the rationing decisions.
It is the second challenge to the traditional view that ulti-
mately renders the view untenable. It simply is not possible to
have persons other than physicians develop rationing guidelines
for physicians to implement. Not only is it not possible to main-
tain a distinction between the development and implementation
of rationing guidelines, it is also not possible to take the re-
sponsibility for the development and implementation of ration-
ing guidelines from physicians.
First, it is not possible to maintain a distinction between
developing rationing guidelines and implementing them. The
argument is analogous to the argument that it is not possible
for judges to maintain a distinction between making law and
interpreting law. There are literally thousands, if not millions,
of different medical decisions that must be made for patients. If
someone suffers a head injury, when should x-rays be per-
formed? When should a CT scan or MRI scan be performed in-
stead of, or in addition to, x-rays? If a person has chest pain,
when should an EKG or a gastroscopy be performed? When
should patients with difficulty breathing be admitted to the
hospital? When should patients who have gallstones have their
gall bladder removed? If a patient needs to have his or her gall
bladder removed, when should the gall bladder be taken out
through a laparoscopic procedure and when should it be re-
moved through open abdominal surgery? Which patients should
be in an intensive care unit? If there is not room for everyone
who needs intensive care in the intensive care unit, who should
have priority? Which patients with coronary artery disease
should undergo bypass surgery and which should be treated
with medication? How long should patients remain in the hospi-
tal after delivering a baby, undergoing an appendectomy or re-
ceiving a kidney transplant? To what extent should the guide-
lines take into account individual variation from patient to
patient? For physicians to act only as implementers of rationing
guidelines, someone else would have to develop answers to all
of these questions for physicians. Physicians would then figure
out whether the patient falls into the treatment or non-treat-
ment category. Yet, it takes time to assess the value of a par-
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ticular treatment and to decide whether it should be covered.
From 1992 through 1995, the federal Agency for Health Care
Policy and Research issued practice guidelines for only eighteen
medical problems, at a cost of $500,000 to $1 million per guide-
line.49 When guidelines are developed, they leave as many
questions unanswered as answered. Oregon spent several years
and millions of dollars developing its rationing system, and it
only addressed a small percentage of rationing decisions. For
example, while Oregon covers treatment for heart attacks, its
rationing plan does not make any effort to resolve the question
whether physicians should use streptokinase or t-PA as the
medication to dissolve the clot that caused the heart attack."0
The Oregon Plan also addresses only decisions about when
treatment should be provided, without providing guidance to
physicians when they are deciding how much of a diagnostic
workup to undertake for a patient.5' Even if detailed guide-
lines could be developed, many of them would likely become
outdated by the time they were issued. Medical knowledge is
constantly evolving, so only reasonably general guidelines can
account for changes in information and technology. In short, it
is not possible for health care plans to assume responsibility for
the development of specific rationing guidelines which physi-
cians would implement when treating their patients.52
49. PHYsICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 374-
75 (1995).
50. This is a question of considerable debate in medicine, since t-PA costs $2,000
more per patient than streptokinase but may have a small but significant advantage
over streptokinase in preventing deaths from heart attacks. The GUSTO Investigators,
An International Randomized Trial Comparing Four Thrombolytic Strategies for Acute
Myocardial Infarction, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 678-80 (1993) (studying 41,021
heart attack patients in a prospective, randomized trial over 26 months in 1,081
hospitals in 15 countries); see also Valentin Fuster, Coronary Thrombolysis-A Per-
spective for the Practicing Physician, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 723 (1993).
51. Indeed, the Oregon plan calls for a full diagnostic evaluation and a recom-
mendation from the physician as to the appropriate treatment, with limitations on
the extent to which treatment will be covered. Robert Steinbrook & Bernard Lo, The
Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project-Will It Provide Adequate Medical Care?, 326
NEW ENG. J. MED. 340, 341 (1992).
52. Hall, supra note 1, at 701-703; Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in
Health Care Reform: Promise and Limitations, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 41-42 (1994)
(observing that practice guidelines cannot be specific enough by which to judge medi-
cal decisions since variations in individual circumstances and community resources
need to be accommodated); Mechanic, supra note 2, at 1724-27.
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It is also not possible for health care plans to develop general
standards that can provide clear guidance for individual ration-
ing decisions.53 The appropriateness of a particular test or
treatment depends on the balancing of a number of factors,
such as cost, likelihood of benefit, potential degree of benefit
and potential duration of benefit, which vary from treatment to
treatment and from patient to patient, and there is no formula
that can tell a physician whether a treatment's high potential
degree or duration of benefit outweighs its low likelihood of
benefit. The best we can do is establish some general principles
that must be applied in individual cases to make rationing
decisions. Yet, just as general principles of law cannot deter-
mine the result for a particular legal question,54 general ra-
tioning principles cannot determine the result for individual
rationing decisions. For example, while we can all agree that
saving lives is an important goal of medicine but that there are
limits to how much we can spend to extend every life, these
principles do not tell us whether it was appropriate to separate
the Lakeberg twins in the hope that one of the infants might
survive.55 Physicians will have to bring to bear their own val-
ues when making rationing decisions. Different physicians will
come to different conclusions-indeed, the Lakeberg family's
Chicago physicians refused to operate, and Philadelphia physi-
cians then agreed to perform the surgery---and there is no
way to ensure that all physicians come to the same conclu-
sion.57 In short, because specific guidelines cannot be created,
53. According to a recent report, the federal government's practice guidelines have
had little effect in changing physicians' practices, in part because they are often too
vague to give adequate guidance in specific situations. Joe R. Neel, Guidelines Go
Unheeded: A Government Effort to Change Doctors' Behavior Draws Apathy Instead,
PHYSICiAN'S WEEKLY, Aug. 22, 1994, at 13.
54. Allan C. Hutchinson and Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical
Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV.
199, 206 (1984).
55. The Lakeberg twins were connected at birth, sharing parts of the heart, such
that it was impossible for both to survive and improbable that even one would sur-
vive if the children were divided surgically. Ultimately, one died as a result of the
surgery, and the second lived for about a year. Karen Brandon & Janet Cawley,
Lakeberg Baby Dies; Medical Debate Lingers, CHI. TRIB., June 10, 1994, at 1.
56. Karen Brandon, Doctors Who Operated on Lakeberg Twins Faced Questions
with No Easy Answers for Survivor, "What Are We Really Creating?", CHI. TRIB., Feb.
21, 1994, at 1.
57. Given the uncertainty about most medical decisions, it is not necessarily
wrong to have variations from physician to physician. Mechanic, supra note 2, at
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and general rationing principles will always be indeterminate
for particular rationing decisions, the development and imple-
mentation of rationing guidelines must occur as intertwined
endeavors. As a corollary, because each patient's circumstances
are unique, every time physicians decide whether or not to
provide a medical service, they are essentially both creating and
implementing a new rationing policy.
The indeterminacy of rationing guidelines can be illustrated
by two commentators' efforts to enunciate general rationing
principles for physicians. Haavi Morreim has proposed that
physicians judge each medical decision by its ability to be gen-
eralized. She argues that, when physicians are considering a
particular test or treatment and they are concerned about its
affordability, they should ask themselves whether the patient's
health care plan could afford to have physicians provide the
proposed test or treatment every time the same situation aris-
es.58 While Morreim articulates an excellent principle, it can-
not relieve physicians of the obligation to develop rationing
policies when they make medical decisions. As already dis-
cussed, one of the major objections to physician decision-making
is the fact that each physician will draw the balance between
the needs of the patient before them and the needs of other
patients differently, depending on their own values and assess-
ments of what the system can afford. Morreim's approach does
not adequately address that problem. Some physicians may
deem cardiac care more important than psychiatric care; other
physicians may reverse the priority.
Susan Wolf has suggested a sliding scale approach, with
greater obligations to provide treatment when harm can be
prevented than when benefit can be conferred. Specifically, she
argues that physicians have: (a) the "strongest duty" to provide
treatment when the treatment is likely to prevent "great harm"
to the patient; (b) a "strong duty" to provide treatment when
the treatment is likely to prevent "some harm;" (c) a "duty" to
provide treatment when the treatment is likely to confer "great
1724-29. Nevertheless, the point stands that it is the individual physicians who are
ultimately making the rationing decisions.
58. E. HAAvI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF
MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS 128 (1991).
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benefit;" and (d) a "weak duty" to provide treatment when
treatment is likely to confer "some benefit."59 Wolfs basic point
is an important one: the greater the need for treatment, the
greater the obligation to provide it. Yet her guidelines too lack
sufficient specificity. Where is the line between great harm and
some harm, or between great benefit and some benefit? What
will a physician do when faced with a situation for which there
is a "weak duty" to provide care? Does that mean there is a
presumption in favor of treatment but that the presumption
should be overridden if there are countervailing circumstances?
Which countervailing circumstances would count? Would the
obligation to treat turn on the health plan's current balance
sheet, or on whether there are other patients with more com-
pelling needs vying for the physician's time? What exactly is
the distinction between preventing harm and conferring benefit?
If a physician lowers a patient's risk of dying, is that prevent-
ing harm (avoiding death) or conferring benefit (prolonging
life)?
It is not only the case that we cannot separate the develop-
ment and implementation of rationing guidelines. It is also the
case that responsibility for the development and implementation
of rationing guidelines must rest with physicians. As I have
observed, it is not possible for managed care plans to establish
rationing guidelines that will resolve all rationing questions.
Accordingly, physicians will frequently be faced with rationing
decisions for which there are no clear answers. In theory, physi-
cians could bring these decisions to another party, for example,
a designated agent for the health plan's subscribers" or a
claims reviewer for the health care plan. However, given the
tremendous number of decisions that must be made, it would
be too cumbersome to bring them to a third party as they
arose. Physicians would constantly be on the telephone and
would end up spending as much time getting answers to cover-
age questions as they did taking care of their patients. More-
over, on what basis will physicians decide that a particular
decision is covered by general rationing guidelines, and it is
therefore not necessary to seek guidance from someone else?
59. Wolf, supra note 1, at 35-36.
60. Veatch, supra note 25, at 481-82.
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The decision whether to seek guidance is itself a decision about
rationing.6
1
On the other hand, if physicians assume responsibility for
rationing, it will be administratively very efficient. Physicians
will know much of the information about the benefits, risks and
costs of treatment relevant to making the rationing decisions
before them. Their greater intimacy with their patients and
their proximity to the clinical setting give them a greater sensi-
tivity to the intangible considerations than more distant poten-
tial decision-makers can have.62 It is no accident that physi-
cians have had responsibility for some seventy-five percent of
health care expenditures." Nor is it an accident that physi-
cians have historically had responsibility for deciding when
treatments should be offered to patients even though the deci-
sions are essentially value judgments, for which physicians
have no special expertise,' rather than "medical" judgments,
for which physicians might have some special expertise.65
The argument for relying on physicians to make rationing
decisions, then, is not that they are good decision-makers, but
that there is no better way to make rationing decisions, and
that there are important efficiencies to having physicians make
these decisions. Once it is recognized that physicians must both
determine and implement rationing policies, it follows that
health care plans need to ensure that physicians incorporate
cost considerations into their decision-making.
b. Preserving Individuation of Patient Care
While financial incentives are not the only.way to make phy-
sicians conscious of costs in their medical decision-making, they
encourage cost containment without sacrificing the ability of
physicians to individualize the care they provide their patients.
61. Carolyn M. Clancy & Howard Brody, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde, 273
JAMA 338, 339 (1995).
62. Mechanic, supra note 2, at 1727-28.
63. Carolyn Long Engelhard & James F. Childress, Caveat Emptor: The Cost of
Managed Care, 10 TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE, L. & ETHIcS 11, 13 (1995).
64. Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264
JAMA 1276, 1277-79 (1990).
65. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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There are essentially two ways for health care plans to en-
sure cost-conscious practices by their physicians for the bulk of
decisions that are not controlled by formal rationing guidelines.
Health care plans can use personal financial incentives for
physicians, or they can impose caps on the resources available
to physicians with which the physicians provide care. As dis-
cussed earlier,66 personal financial incentives include salary,
capitation, fee withholds, bonuses and expanded capitation. Re-
source caps generally take one of two forms: fixed caps on spe-
cific medical services or an overall fixed budget.67 An HMO, for
example, can limit the number of blood analyzers, MRI scan-
ners, intensive care unit beds, and operating suites that it
owns, forcing physicians to recognize that every time they order
a test or provide a treatment, they are making that test or
treatment unavailable for other patients who might have a
greater need for the test or treatment. Or, a health care plan
could make available a fixed budget to its physicians and insist
that the physicians not exceed the budget in providing health
care.6" Physicians will recognize that, every time they order a
test or provide a treatment, there will be fewer resources avail-
able for other patients who might have a greater need for the
resources.
Financial incentives and overall fixed budgets both have two
important and related advantages over fixed limits on specific
services-greater individuation of patient care and greater phy-
sician autonomy.
i. Greater Individuation of Patient Care and Greater Physician
Autonomy
Patients and physicians should prefer financial incentives to
caps on specific services. With caps on specific services, physi-
cians will face substantial limitations on their ability to tailor
their care to the needs of their patients. The mix of health care
services that physicians can provide will be constrained by the
mix of services and facilities that the HMO has established in
advance. For example, in HMOs that have a high ratio of spe-
66. Supra part III.A.
67. Ellman & Hall, supra note 12, at 193-94.
68. This is different from capitation because the physician's compensation would
be separate from the budget for health care services.
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cialists to primary care physicians, patients will receive more
specialty care, while patients in HMOs with a low ratio of spe-
cialists to primary care physicians will receive more primary
care. If the HMO has a shortage of MRI scanners, patients who
need MRI scanning will be underserved. The HMO will likely
employ a formulary69 that limits which drugs the HMO's phy-
sicians can prescribe, and it will monitor lab tests, x-rays and
other ancillary services to identify physicians who use these
services relatively frequently. HMOs and other managed care
plans often go even further to influence physician decisions.
They may impose caps on the number of days a patient can be
hospitalized for different procedures, with different caps for
different procedures-two days for labor and delivery, five days
for an appendectomy, ten days for coronary artery bypass sur-
gery, and so on.
Many of the limitations are based on the needs of the typical
or average patient and therefore fail to take into account the
particular needs of the unusual patient. If a health plan re-
quires discharge of a mother and child within twenty-four hours
after delivery, the plan's rule does not accommodate the needs
of those mothers and children whose complications become
apparent only after twenty-four hours or those mothers who
need extra assistance with breastfeeding and other parenting
activities.7 Or, if a health plan authorizes no more than ten
days of hospitalization for a patient undergoing peripheral vas-
cular surgery, the plan will not meet the needs of the patient
with a complicated post-operative course who needs an extra
week in the hospital.7' If physicians are given broad latitude
69. Drug formularies are systems in which health care plans approve only certain
drugs for use or approve some drugs for limited use, unless the patient pays out-of-
pocket for the unapproved use. Drug formularies predate managed care and have
been used for many years in hospitals to ensure both higher quality and lower cost
of care.
70. COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, IMPACT OF
24-HouR POSTPARTUM STAY ON INFANT AND MATERNAL HEALTH (June 1995). Because
of concerns about discharges after 24 hours, some states have passed legislation re-
quiring health care plans to pay for a second day of hospitalization after delivery.
Jon Nordheimer, New Mothers Win Second Day of Hospital Care in New Jersey, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1995, at B1.
71. See, e.g., Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986) (patient suffered leg
amputation following allegedly premature discharge from the hospital). While health
plans permit physicians to seek exceptions to their rules, exceptions are not always
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in allocating health care resources, they can individualize the
care, taking into account the particular needs and circumstanc-
es of each patient.72
In contrast to limits on specific services, consider the alterna-
tives of an overall fixed budget or the most extreme form of
financial incentive, capitation fees that are designed to cover all
of the patient's health care needs ("global" capitation fees). The
fixed budget or capitation fees that physicians would receive for
their assigned group of patients would have to cover the
patients' office visits, referrals to other physicians, laboratory
tests, x-rays, hospitalizations and other health care services.
Under such a payment system, physicians are subject to only
one constraint-that the total costs for all of their patients not
exceed their fixed budget or the total sum of all of their capita-
tion fees.73 There would be no utilization reviewers needed to
approve non-emergency admissions to the hospital or to regu-
late the numbers of days that patients spend in the hospital.
There would be no need for health plan administrators to moni-
tor the number of cholesterol tests or blood sugar measure-
ments ordered by physicians, nor would there be a need to
restrict the number of drugs that physicians can prescribe to
granted even when justifiable, and physicians may also be discouraged from seeking
exceptions, especially if their plans penalize physicians who are more likely than their
colleagues to obtain exceptions. Id. at 813-14.
In some cases, it appears that health plan guidelines are based not even on
average needs but on the needs of patients in the best of circumstances. For example,
in developing benchmarks to which managed care plans should strive, the consulting
company Milliman and Robertson based its benchmarks on the experiences of the
10% of patients in each type of treatment who needed the least amount of care.
Thus, f experience showed that 10% of patients could be discharged within one day
of an appendectomy, the benchmarks set a goal for discharging appendectomy pa-
tients within one day of their surgery. Greg Borzo, R.I. Doctors Face "Absurd" Inpa-
tient Limits, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 21, 1994, at 1, 9; Allen R. Myerson, Helping
Health Insurers Say No, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at D1. Some health plans ap-
parently are using the Milliman & Robertson recommendations as guidelines that
should be followed for all patients, unless an extension is justified, rather than as
aspirational benchmarks. MANAGED CARE AND THE MARKET, supra note 14, at 11.
72. H. Gilbert Welch, Should the Health Care Forest Be Selectively Thinned by
Physicians or Clear Cut by Payers?, 115 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 223, 224 (1991). A
recent study of the effects of drug formularies in HMOs found that, as HMOs im-
posed greater restrictions on access to prescription drugs, overall health care costs
were higher. Ron Winslow, Limiting Drugs a Doctor Orders May Cost More, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 20, 1996, at E1.
73. More precisely, their capitation fees must equal the sum of their patients'
health care costs plus their own income.
[Vol. 30:155
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO LIMIT CARE
their patients. Psychiatrists would not be told whether to treat
a patient in the hospital or through office visits, nor would they
be told how many therapy sessions to provide to each pa-
tient.74 Physicians would be able to allocate their fees in the
manner that they deem most desirable, both in terms of how
many resources they allocate to each patient under their care
and in terms of which kinds of health care services are provid-
ed to their patients.
If health plans try to limit costs by imposing greater con-
straints on physician discretion, they risk not only endangering
patient welfare but also undermining the very nature of medi-
cine as a profession, causing conflict between health plans and
physicians and alienating physicians from their work.75 Physi-
cians, like their patients, have a strong need for personal au-
tonomy. Society respects individual dignity when it permits peo-
ple to have control over essential aspects of their lives, and, for
most people, professional expression is a critical element of
personhood. As Robert Gordon has observed, control over the
working environment is a basic precondition to the realization
of a free, authentic personality.76 And, as studies have consis-
tently demonstrated, people need a good deal of independence
in the workplace to be content with, and productive in, their
employment.77
74. Carol Hymowitz & Ellen Joan Pollock, Cost-Cutting Firms Monitor Couch
Time as Therapists Fret, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1995, at Al.
75. Frankford, supra note 1, at 79-101. While Frankford expresses concern about
the use of financial incentives, his concern is ultimately about the linking of financial
incentives with treatment protocols or practice guidelines that are designed to dictate
physicians' medical decisions. It is the restriction on physician autonomy, not the use
of financial incentives, that is problematic in Frankford's view. Id.
76. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988).
77. R.J. BULLOCK, IMPROVING JOB SATISFACTION 4-5 (1984); Katherine I. Miller &
Peter R. Monge, Participation, Satisfaction, and Productivity: A Meta-Analytic Review,
29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 727 (1986). The public also benefits from physician autonomy.
Medicine will not attract talented people if physicians are not given the opportunity
for self-determination. In addition, professional autonomy inculcates a sense of moral
responsibility in physicians. David Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional Organi-
zation on Physician Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583, 584-91 (1994).
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c. Effective Cost Containment
While financial incentives and overall fixed budgets both
preserve the ability of physicians to individualize patient care,
financial incentives offer an important advantage toward the
goal of effective cost containment.
Because financial incentives give physicians a constant
incentive to lower costs, physicians will be driven constantly to
practice in the most cost-effective way. Physicians will have an
ongoing incentive to lower health care costs. When overall
budget caps are used, the most likely result is that physicians
will use up the entire amount of resources that are at their
disposal. There is no incentive to use fewer resources than
those available. Consequently, health care costs are likely to
creep up slowly over time. Indeed, countries like Canada that
rely heavily on budget caps to limit health care spending are
experiencing problems with health care cost inflation similar to
those in the United States.78 Competition among different
health plans for subscribers might provide a constant incentive
to reduce costs.79 However, like other industries, the health
care insurance market will gradually become more concentrated,
and competitive pressures among different health plans will
diminish.
C. Alternatives to Financial Incentives to Limit Care
Critics of financial incentives argue that health care plans
need not rely on financial incentives, but that, in addition to
resource caps, there are other methods to contain costs. For
example, health care plans might be able to (1) use educational
methods to ensure cost-conscious behavior by physicians; (2)
link financial incentives to quality of care rather than quantity
of care; or (3) give patients, rather than physicians, the finan-
cial incentive to limit care. While all of these alternatives are
78. Clyde H. Farnsworth, The Bill Comes Due: Canada's Health Care Costs--A
Special Report; Now Patients are Paying Amid Canadian Cutbacks, N.Y. Times, Mar.
7, 1993, at 1; John K_ Iglehart, Canada's Health Care System Faces Its Problems, 322
NEW ENG. J. MED. 562, 564 (1990).
79. Ellman & Hall, supra note 12, at 193-97.
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useful to some extent, they are at best a complement to finan-
cial incentives or resource caps.
1. Education
Accomplishing change through education is always a laudable
goal, and one would expect physicians to be especially respon-
sive to new information, given the amount of time that physi-
cians spend in school and training before beginning their pro-
fessional careers. Yet, as a practical matter, education cannot
offer very much in the way of ensuring more cost-conscious
behavior by physicians.
First, the empirical data suggest that physicians are in fact
not very responsive to educational efforts that are designed to
change physician practices. The empirical data come from a
number of sources. For example, for the past two decades, there
has been increasing attention to the development of "practice
guidelines," which, as their name suggests, are formal recom-
mendations that are designed as guides to physician practice.
Practice guidelines exist for a wide range of medical conditions
or treatments, including the timing of childhood vaccinations,'0
the situations in which a child should be delivered by cesarean
section8' and the patients for whom coronary artery bypass
surgery is appropriate." These guidelines are developed by
panels of medical experts based on their review of published
research and their own clinical experience." So far, the evi-
dence indicates that even though physicians may be familiar
with practice guidelines and agree with them, the issuance and
dissemination alone of guidelines does not have a significant
impact on physician practices.'
80. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INFEC-
TIOUS DISEASES 5-60 (21st ed. 1988).
81. Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Effects of the National Institutes of Health Consen-
sus Development Program on Physician Practice, 258 JAMA 2708, 2709 (1987).
82. ACC/AHA Task Force Report, Guidelines and Indications for Coronary Artery
Bypass Graft Surgery, 17 J. AM. COLL. CARD. 543 (1991).
83. John T. Kelly & James E. Swartwout, Development of Practice Parameters by
Physician Organizations, 16 QUALrrY REV. BULL. 54 (1990).
84. Kosecoff, supra note 81, at 2712 (studying the effects of four sets of practice
guidelines in the case of 2800 patients in 10 hospitals in one state during the two
years before and two years after issuance of the guidelines and finding no significant
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Other educational efforts have shown more, but still limited,
success. A number of researchers have examined the effects of
giving physicians guidelines or other information aimed at re-
ducing the costs of care for the physicians' patients,85 and fol-
lowing up with feedback to the physicians about their actual
practices compared with those of other physicians or with for-
mal guidelines. These studies have had mixed results, with
some showing significant improvement88 and others finding no
significant change. 7 There are several reasons why these stud-
ies are not very encouraging. First, not only did many of the
studies not show any benefit from the efforts to improve physi-
cian practices, but the published studies undoubtedly provide
an exaggerated view of the effectiveness of the efforts. This is
because studies that show positive results are more likely to be
accepted for publication than studies that show no benefit.88
impact); Jonathan Lomas et al., Do Practice Guidelines Guide Practice?: The Effect of
a Consensus Statement on the Practice of Physicians, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1306,
1310 (1989) (comparing surveys of physicians attitudes with two years of data on
cesarean section rates in Ontario, Canada).
85. Generally, the information is designed both to eliminate unnecessary testing
and ensure that necessary tests are not omitted.
86. See, e.g., John E. Billi et al., The Effects of a Low-Cost Intervention Program
on Hospital Costs, 7 J. GEN. INT. MED. 411 (1992) (studying the effects of a pamphlet
with cost-saving strategies and feedback on costs incurred for residents at a teaching
hospital over a one-year period and finding a 7.8% decrease in length of stay and a
7.1% decrease in overall costs incurred for patients studied); Kim A. Eagle et al.,
Length of Stay in the Intensive Care Unit: Effects of Practice Guidelines and Feed-
back, 264 JAMA 992 (1990) (studying the impact of practice guidelines in the care of
more than 1000 patients located in a hospital's intensive care units over a 16-month
period and finding that the average length of stay in the units had declined); Linda
M. Frazier et al., Can Physician Education Lower the Cost of Prescription Drugs?: A
Prospective, Controlled Trial, 115 ANNALS INT. MED. 116 (1991); Larry M. Manheim et
al., Training House Officers to be Cost Conscious: Effects of an Educational Interven-
tion on Charges and Length of Stay, 28 MED. CARE 29 (1990) (studying the effects of
12-14 hours of education over a two-month period with feedback on actual practices
for 105 interns at an academic medical center).
87. See, e.g., Thomas A. Parrino, The Nonvalue of Retrospective Peer Comparison
Feedback in Containing Hospital Antibiotic Costs, 86 AM. J. MED. 442 (1989) (finding
no impact on antibiotics costs at a hospital from sending monthly letters to the phy-
sicians in the top 50% of antibiotics use notifying them of their spending in relation
to their colleagues); Steven A. Schroeder et al., The Failure of Physician Education as
a Cost Containment Strategy: Report of a Prospective Controlled Trial at a University
Hospital, 252 JAMA 225 (1984) (studying the impact of weekly one-hour lectures with
feedback on actual practices for 225 resident physicians over a two-year period and
finding no significant impact on overall costs of care); Sankey V. Williams & John M.
Eisenberg, A Controlled Trial to Decrease the Unnecessary Use of Diagnostic Tests, 1
J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 8 (1986).
88. Kay Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors for Its
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Second, many of the studies that showed positive results were
not adequately controlled for confounding variables.89 For ex-
ample, a program designed to reduce laboratory tests may in
fact result in such a reduction, but there may also be an off-
setting increase in x-rays or other diagnostic procedures. Or,
if a program resulted in shorter hospital stays, the lowered
costs may have been offset by an increase in outpatient costs
after discharge. Many of the studies looked at only part of
patient care costs rather than overall costs,9 so it is not possi-
ble to tell whether the interventions were effective. Third, the
educational interventions were sometimes so expensive that
their costs were not much lower than their savings.2 Fourth,
after many of the interventions that were successful while they
were in effect, the physicians gradually reverted to their previ-
ous practices.93
Some commentators have suggested that, if we analyze the
successful educational interventions, we can discover which
kinds of interventions work and under which circumstances.
From this knowledge, it is argued, effective educational inter-
ventions could be developed. 4 In addition, most of the studies
Occurrence, 263 JAMA 1385 (1990).
89. JOHN M. EISENBERG, DOCTORS' DECISIONS AND THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE
100 (1986).
90. Schroeder, supra note 87, at 228-29 (studying the effects of four hours of
intensive review of interns' test-ordering behavior on the frequency with which eight
out of a group of 24 interns ordered laboratory tests and x-rays).
91. See, e.g., Albert R. Martin, et al., A Trial of Two Strategies to Modify the
Test-Ordering Behavior of Medical Residents, 303 N. ENG. J. MED. 1330 (1980) (study-
ing the effects of four hours of intensive review of interns' test-ordering behavior on
the frequency with which eight out of a group of 24 interns ordered laboratory tests
and x-rays).
92. EISENBERG, supra note 89, at 116-17; Schroeder, supra note 83, at 230.
93. See, e.g., Thomas J. Meyer et al., Reduction of Polypharmacy by Feedback to
Clinicians, 6 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 133 (1991) (studying 290 patients at a single
clinic who were receiving more than 10 medicines each and finding that a letter to
the patients' physicians recommend a reduction in the number of drugs led to sig-
nificant decreases in use four and six months after the sending of the letter, but no
effect 12 months after the sending of the letter); William M. Tierney et al., The Effect
on Test Ordering of Informing Physicians of the Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic
Tests, 322 N. ENG. J. MED. 1499 (1990) (studying the effect of informing 60 physi-
cians of the costs of laboratory tests when the physicians ordered the tests over a 26-
week period and for an additional 19 weeks after the researchers stopped providing
the information about costs).
94. See, e.g., Peter J. Greco & John M. Eisenberg, Changing Physicians' Practices,
329 N. ENG. J. MED. 1271, 1272 (1993).
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of education and feedback occurred when physicians still prac-
ticed primarily in a fee-for-service environment in which more
tests and procedures meant more income. Consequently, physi-
cians faced countervailing incentives that may have prevented
the educational efforts from being successful. For example, phy-
sicians may have continued performing unnecessary cesarean
sections because they believed the procedures would reduce
their risk of malpractice liability,95 they were responding to
financial and other personal incentives to perform cesarean
sections," and/or they were acceding to their patients' requests
for cesarean sections. 7 In a managed care environment, in
which more services means less income, a physician's personal
incentives would augment rather than oppose educational
efforts.
Yet, even with optimal educational efforts, it will not be
possible to ensure sufficient cost consciousness by physicians.
The argument here is a corollary to the argument for why it is
not possible for health care plans, or anyone else, to provide
specific rationing guidelines for physicians. If health plans can-
not establish specific guidelines, then they do not have the body
of information needed to educate physicians. In other words, if
a health care plan does not know exactly how it wants its phy-
sicians to lower costs, what would its educational materials look
like? If the education consists of general principles, then we are
back to the problem of general principles being too vague to
provide sufficient guidance to physicians in containing costs.
2. Utilization Review
Health care plans commonly use administrative processes to
regulate the amount of care provided to their subscribers. For
example, many plans require their subscribers to receive ap-
95. If an infant is born with a serious injury and the parents sue, a jury might
attribute the injury to the use of a vaginal delivery even if the injury in fact oc-
curred before the woman's labor commenced.
96. Physicians are often paid a higher fee for a cesarean section than a vaginal
delivery. Even if the obstetrician receives the same fee for a vaginal delivery, cesare-
an sections require less time thereby freeing up the physician for other activities,
including income producing activities.
97. The patients may want to avoid a painful and prolonged delivery. Lomas,
supra note 84, at 1310.
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proval from the plan before they enter the hospital for an elec-
tive procedure.98 In addition, as mentioned, plans often impose
limits on the number of days that patients can be treated in
the hospital for particular problems, and they may routinely
review individual patient charts to ensure that patients are not
being kept in the hospital too long.99
While utilization review has a role in cost containment, it
has only a limited role. First, the cost savings from utilization
review have been disappointing. Studies of the effect of utiliza-
tion review in the Medicare program found that there were
small reductions in hospital use but no net savings in costs.' °
Some private health care insurers have been able to achieve
modest reductions in health care expenditures, but even then
the reductions are one-time savings with no impact of the utili-
zation review program on the rate of growth of health care
costs.' 1 There is an even more fundamental problem with re-
lying on utilization review. Utilization review is essentially a
type of cost containment in which the rationing decisions are
made by persons other than physicians. Accordingly, for the
same reasons that most rationing decisions must ultimately be
left to physicians," 2 utilization review cannot avoid the need
for health plans to contain costs through financial incentives or
resource caps.
3. Quality-Based Incentives
Many commentators have criticized financial incentives to
limit care on the ground that they reward all decisions to with-
hold medical services, not only when the withheld care would
98. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE?:
THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 17-19 (Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Field
eds., 1989) [hereinafter CONTROLLING COSTS].
99. Id. at 18.
100. Thomas M. Wickizer, The Effects of Utilization Review on Hospital Use and
Expenditures: A Covariance Analysis, 27 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 103, 104 (1992).
101. CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 98, at 3-4; Thomas M. Wickizer et al., Does
Utilization Review Reduce Unnecessary Hospital Care and Contain Costs?, 27 MED.
CARE 632, 645 (1989) (comparing hospital services and costs over a two-year period
for 91 insured groups governed by utilization review with those of 132 insured groups
that did not operate under utilization review).
102. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
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be unnecessary or only marginally beneficial but also when the
withheld care would provide considerable benefit. These com-
mentators argue that it would be much better to tailor financial
incentives such that they reward cost cutting only when the
cost cutting is cost effective. In other words, financial incentives
should be linked to the quality of care provided, not the quanti-
ty of care provided. For some patients, it is cost effective to
provide additional care, and physicians should not be penalized
for providing that care.
There are several problems with this position. First, financial
incentives to limit care do provide a strong incentive to limit
only unnecessary or marginally beneficial care. This becomes
apparent when financial incentives are considered from a long-
term rather than short-term perspective. Because delays in
intervention can allow a disease to develop or progress and
become more costly to treat, incentives to limit care may actu-
ally result in more aggressive efforts by physicians to ensure
that patients receive preventive and therapeutic services as
early as possible. If physicians are penalized for high health
care costs, they are more likely to try to prevent high costs
from materializing. Indeed, many early proponents encouraged
the development of HMOs because of their emphasis on pre-
ventive care, not simply as a means to contain health care
costs, and studies indicate that people in HMOs receive more
preventive care and more health-promotive activities than sub-
scribers to traditional, fee-for-service plans. °3 In short, it is
quite possible that financial incentives to limit care will lead to
more efficient utilization of health care resources.
Second, quality-based incentives are very difficult to design.
It is not a simple matter to distinguish good from poor practice.
For example, which measurements should be used? If we look
at seemingly objective measures like death rates, we may not
obtain sufficient data. Many diseases, though not potentially fa-
tal, can seriously compromise quality of life.' We could look
at a person's quality of life or functional status, but these sub-
103. Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since
1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1516 (1994).
104. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health System Reform: Forward or Backward With
Quality Oversight?, 271 JAMA 1508, 1509 (1994).
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jective measures are very difficult, and costly, to ascertain."5
More importantly, a patient may suffer a poor outcome not only
because the physician gave poor care but for a number of other
reasons, such as the patient's initially serious illness. Before
quality of care can be assessed, confounding variables need to
be eliminated, and this is often very hard to do. Indeed, the
Health Care Financing Administration stopped reporting death
rates of patients for each hospital because it was unable to sort
out hospital quality from other contributors to the death
rates.0 6 The difficulty in measuring quality of care is reflected
by one study that found that, in order to obtain a reliable as-
sessment of a physician's clinical skills by the physician's peers,
the assessment would have to be based on the ratings of at
least eleven different colleagues."' Even if we settle on what
our quality measures should look like, we rarely have adequate
data for specific medical services to tell us when there is good
quality of care. For many treatments, even commonly used
ones, there are not enough well-designed studies to tell us
whether the treatments actually work.
08
Third, and most important, it is not clear how we would
know when a physician is practicing cost-effective medicine. As
I have observed, it is not possible to establish rationing guide-
lines that address more than a small percentage of medical
decisions. For all the other rationing decisions that physicians
make, we must rely on physician discretion. That being so, we
have no measures by which we can distinguish the cost-effective
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Paul G. Ramsey et al., Use of Peer Ratings to Evaluate Physician Perfor-
mance, 269 JAMA 1655 (1993) (assessing quality of 300 internists in three states).
108. David M. Eddy & John Billings, The Quality of Medical Evidence: Implications
for Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988, at 19, 21-23. Indeed, it is regularly
asserted that, according to estimates of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),
only 10-20% of medical practices are supported by well-controlled studies. Id. Howev-
er, this estimate was not made by the OTA but by Kerr White without substantiation
in an article written in 1968 that was subsequently cited in a 1978 report of the
Office of Technology Assessment. UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY AND SAFETY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 60, 94
(1978) (citing Kerr L. White, International Comparisons of Health Services Systems, 46
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 117, 120 (1968)). Since then, the estimate frequently
has been mistakenly attributed to the OTA. See, e.g., THE PEPPER COMMISSION, UNIT-
ED STATES BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE, A CALL FOR
ACTION: FINAL REPORT 41 (Sept. 1990).
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physicians from the cost-ineffective physicians. We could
identify a few measures of cost effectiveness and evaluate phy-
sicians on the basis of those few measures on the assumption
that we would have a reasonable proxy for cost effectiveness
generally. However, physicians could game the system by tak-
ing care with the measured treatments and thereby protecting
their income, but otherwise not practicing cost-effective medi-
cine.' °9
4. Financial Incentives for Patients
A number of commentators have observed that, if costs need
to be contained, then we should give patients rather than phy-
sicians the responsibility for rationing decisions. Patients are
paying for their health care, and they should decide what they
will receive for their health care dollars. While having employ-
er-paid health care insurance has often insulated individuals
from the economic consequences of health care decisions, we
can modify health care coverage to ensure that patients realize
a greater financial benefit by keeping their health care costs
down. For example, if a person joins an HMO instead of sub-
scribing to a more expensive fee-for-service plan, then the per-
son could pocket the entire difference in costs between the two
plans. Instead of paying a fixed percentage of the premium for
whichever plan is chosen by the employee, employers could pay
a flat amount toward the employee's premium." ° Financial
incentives for patients could be used not only to influence a
person's choice of health care plan but also to influence deci-
sions to seek or accept care after the insurance is purchased.
For example, a person's health care "premium" could be split
between insurance coverage for catastrophic or other high cost,
essential care, and a special account that can be used to pay
for preventive care, routine care or other small medical
bills."' If there is money left in the special account at the end
109. Jost, supra note 104, at 1510:
110. Alain Enthoven and Richard Kronick, A Consumer Choice Health Plan for the
1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and
Economy (pt. 1), 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 29, 33 (1989). Similarly, the tax deductible
amount of a health care insurance premium could be capped rather than allowed to
increase as the cost of the premium increases. Id.
111. E. Haavi Morreim, The Ethics of Incentives in Managed Care, 10 TRENDS IN
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of the year, it would be returned to the individual. To ensure
that patients do not skip preventive measures that can avoid
the need for high-cost care later," patients could be rewarded
for seeking specified immunizations or screening tests (e.g., pap
smears or mammograms)."' Giving patients a greater finan-
cial incentive to conserve health care resources can help contain
health care costs. However, as I will argue, it is, at best, a
supplement to methods targeted at physician behavior.
Before I discuss why there are limits to the utility of finan-
cial incentives for patients, I will explain why two of the com-
mon objections to patient-based incentives do not survive scru-
tiny. First, commentators have criticized these incentives on the
ground that patients do not have sufficient knowledge or exper-
tise to decide when medical treatment is worth its cost. Princi-
ples of patient autonomy, however, suggest otherwise. In the
past two decades, patients have been given greater control over
medical decisions on the grounds that medical decisions involve
the highly subjective weighing of benefits and risks and that
patients are in the best position to weigh those benefits and
risks for themselves, even when the risks include death. If
patients are able to reject health care because they do not like
physical side effects or simply because they no longer want to
live, they should also be able to reject health care because it is
not worth its cost."
Some commentators have argued that patients are not very
sensitive to prices, and that health care is too important for
patients to respond to price competition. This argument is also
not very persuasive. People routinely risk their health for fi-
nancial reasons. For example, many individuals work in mining
and other hazardous occupations because they receive a higher
wage as compensation for the risk. People also accept lower
HEALTH CARE, L. & ETmcs 56, 59-60 (1995); E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality
by Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 79, 99-100 (1994); Mark V. Pauly
& John C. Goodman, Tax Credits for Health Insurance and Medical Savings Accounts,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 126, 127-28.
112. This behavior would occur in some patients since they would be financially
liable for preventive or screening care while the health care plan would be liable for
later, more expensive care. Indeed, under traditional, fee-for-service plans, preventive
care is typically not covered, and many patients do not seek the care.
113. Morreim, The Ethics of Incentives, supra note 111, at 59.
114. Morreim, Redefining Quality, supra note 111, at 96-97.
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health care coverage in exchange for lower premiums, as the
rapid growth of HMOs attests, and people enrolled in health
plans with higher co-payments use fewer services."5 There are
also young, relatively healthy, working persons who forgo
health insurance because they do not believe that it is worth its
cost to them.
There are nevertheless several reasons why patient-oriented
incentives cannot replace, but can only supplement, physician-
oriented measures. First, health care insurance greatly dilutes
the financial benefits to patients who forego marginally benefi-
cial care. Because the savings realized from foregone care will
be shared with the other subscribers to the plan, the savings to
the patient will be considerably lower than the actual savings
to the plan. In other words, patients will always have an incen-
tive to overutilize care once they are insured because they will
not pay the full cost of care received nor will they realize the
full savings of care foregone. Co-payments and deductibles can
counter this problem somewhat, but patients will still not be
paying the full cost of additional care once they have paid their
premiums."6 Second, empirical data indicate that, when pa-
tients are required to pay co-payments and deductibles, they do
not reduce their use of marginally beneficial care only; they
also reduce their use of highly effective care." ' In other
115. Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Use of Medical Care in the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment: Diagnosis- and Service-specific Analyses in a Randomized Controlled Trial,
24 MED. CARE S1, S18-S30 (1986) (studying more than 7,700 persons for three to five
years each in six communities who were randomly assigned to health care plans with
different co-payment levels for subscribers); Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Some Interim
Results from a Controlled Trial of Cost Sharing in Health Insurance, 305 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1501 (1981) (studying more than 7,700 persons for three to five years each in
six communities who were randomly assigned to health care plans with different co-
payment levels for subscribers).
116. Mechanic, supra note 2, at 1715.
117. Paula Braveman et al., Insurance-Related Differences in the Risk of Ruptured
Appendix, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 444, 448 (1994) (studying nearly 100,000 hospital-
izations of California residents ages 18 to 64 years old for acute appendicitis over a
five-year period and finding that patients in fee-for-service plans were more likely to
suffer a ruptured appendix than patients in Health Maintenance Organizations and
suggesting that this difference may have resulted from the fee-for-service patients
being slower to seek care because of higher co-payments and deductibles); Lohr, supra
note 111, at S32-S36; Albert L. Siu et al., Inappropriate Use of Hospitals in a Ran-
domized Trial of Health Insurance Plans, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1986) (study-
ing hospitalizations for 3400 adults in six communities who were randomly assigned
for three to five years to health care plans with different co-payment levels for sub-
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words, patients are not very discriminating purchasers of health
care. Third, it is not clear that society is willing to hold pa-
tients to their bargains. If a person chooses a lower cost plan
that denies certain life-saving treatments, and the patient ends
up needing the treatment, we are likely to find that the patient
will be given the care anyway. Consider, for example, what has
been happening with health plan coverage of bone marrow
transplants in conjunction with high-dose chemotherapy for
breast cancer."' There is a good deal of controversy about the
value of this treatment. Some experts believe it is of clear bene-
fit while others argue that we need more data before we can
judge its efficacy."' Given the uncertainty, a strong case can
be made that bone marrow transplant for breast cancer is an
experimental therapy. Yet, even when a health care plan ex-
pressly excludes experimental therapies, the plan often will
extend coverage for bone marrow transplants to subscribers
with breast cancer.' At least one court has held a plan liable
for not covering a bone marrow transplant when coverage was
denied on the basis of an experimental therapy exclusion."2
There is an even more fundamental problem with patient-
based incentives. To rely exclusively, or even primarily, on
patient-based incentives would require a degree of contract
specificity that is not achievable in health care. For patients to
agree to less care in return for lower costs, they would have to
be told exactly what kinds of care and how much care they
would receive at each premium level. If they paid $3,500 in-
stead of $3,000, what extra care would they receive for their
money? Would they get the more expensive clot dissolver t-PA
instead of streptokinase for a heart attack? Would they get
scribers).
118. With this treatment, patients are given very high doses of chemotherapy,
doses that are not ordinarily used because they kill too much of the person's normal
bone marrow tissue in addition to killing the cancer cells. The higher doses can be
used because bone marrow is removed from the patient before the administration of
chemotherapy and reinfused after the administration of the chemotherapy.
119. William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Approval by Insurance
Companies of Coverage for Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Can-
cer, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 473, 473 (1994).
120. Donald W. Light, Life, Death and the Insurance Companies, 330 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 498, 498 (1994).
121. Erik Eckholm, $89 Million Awarded Family Who Sued H.M.O., N.Y. TIES,
Dec. 30, 1993, at Al.
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three days instead of one day in the hospital after giving birth?
Would they receive treatment in an intensive care unit when
they had a one percent chance of recovery instead of a five
percent chance? The same kind of specificity would be required
for catastrophic care plans that had special savings accounts.
The plans would have to figure out exactly when to reward
patients for seeking preventive or routine care and when to
insist that the patient draw down the special account's reserves
to pay for additional care. However, just as it is not possible for
health plans to establish comprehensive rationing guidelines for
physicians, it is not possible for health plans to write contracts
with their subscribers that clearly detail when care will be
provided and when it will not be provided.'22 Indeed, health
plan contracts are typically very general about the terms of
coverage, whether the contracts are written by an HMO or a
traditional indemnity plan. The problem with specificity applies
whether we are talking about luxury or thrifty plans. For ex-
ample, in the benefits booklet for its HMO Illinois, Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Illinois states that it will cover medical or
surgical services provided by a physician as long as the services
are performed or ordered by the subscriber's primary care phy-
sician.' In its indemnity plan, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Illinois covers medical or surgical services provided by a physi-
cian as long as the services are "medically necessary," which is
defined as a service that "is required, in the reasonable medical
judgment of Blue Cross and Blue Shield, for the treatment or
management of a medical symptom or condition [where] the
service or care provided is the most efficient and economical
service which can safely be provided.""
All of this is not to say that there is no role for patient-based
incentives. As the growth of HMOs reflects, people will choose
lower-cost plans in return for lower premiums. However, there
is not much more that can be done with patient-based incen-
tives than to use them to set the health plan's overall budget
and to establish some general limitations on access to care.
122. Ellman & Hall, supra note 12, at 192.
123. BLuE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF ILLINOIS, HMO ILLINOIS: YOUR CERTIFICATE
OF HEALTH CARE BENEFITS 14 (1994).
124. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF ILLINOIS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL PLAN 20-22, 34 (1994).
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People can be told that, in return for lower premiums, they will
have a restricted choice of physician and hospital, that their
primary care physician will have to authorize care before it is
covered, and that certain kinds of care will be excluded (e.g.,
cosmetic surgery). Nevertheless, it will still be left to physicians
to translate a health care plan's smaller budget into the actual
bundle of services provided. If there is a restricted panel of
physicians from whom patients can choose, those physicians
will have to decide, in the bulk of cases, whether care should
be provided. If the plan requires primary care physicians to
authorize care, the primary care physicians will have to rely
largely on their own judgment to decide whether care is covered
by the plan.
IV. BALANCING THE VIRTUES AND DANGERS OF FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES TO LIMIT CARE
There is no obvious answer to the question of whether finan-
cial incentives to limit care ought to be discouraged or encour-
aged. They create important advantages to the health care
system by reversing the incentives toward ever-increasing
health care costs and by facilitating individuation of patient
care and physician autonomy. At the same time, they threaten
the physician's fiduciary duty of responsibility to patients. What
makes the balancing especially difficult is that the virtues and
dangers are inversely proportionate to each other. Greater free-
dom of health plans to employ incentives to limit care means
greater tailoring of care to the needs of individual patients and
greater autonomy for physicians in their medical decision-mak-
ing. However, it also means a greater conflict of interest be-
tween the needs of patients and the personal interests of physi-
cians.
Despite the indeterminacy of the issue, we can come fairly
readily to a few conclusions. First, we can quickly reject the
option of prohibiting financial incentives to limit care entirely.
Once health care plans eliminate compensation arrangements,
like fee-for-service, that provide an incentive to provide care,
there is no choice but to rely on compensation arrangements
that provide an incentive to limit care. There is no neutral
ground. As previously discussed, even a pure salary provides an
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incentive to limit care since salaried physicians lose no income
by spending less time with patients but instead free up time for
other income-producing activities, like consulting, or for other
personally rewarding activities, like research or leisure.
Given the impossibility of avoiding incentives to limit care
entirely, the only question is how much of an incentive should
be allowed. What we are looking for is a level of incentive that
is large enough to make physicians conscious of costs without
being so large that patient welfare is endangered. There is no
clear answer to the above question, nor are there studies that
have measured the impact of different levels of financial incen-
tive on physician cost consciousness and on patient welfare.
Nevertheless, the limited utility of alternative approaches
suggests that there should be a significant role for financial
incentives.
If we look to studies from industry on the relationship be-
tween financial incentives and worker performance, the data
indicate that financial incentives improve worker perfor-
mance." The data also indicate that financial incentives have
a greater impact when they are combined with greater control
by workers over the way their work is conducted. 12 This lat-
ter finding suggests that financial incentives to limit care will
be successful in lowering costs since they are accompanied by
broad physician discretion over the allocation of health care
resources. However, the data from industry tell us little about
the degree to which the success of an incentive depends upon
its magnitude.
27
One useful source of information for this question is a survey
of HMO managers in which the managers were asked to indi-
cate when a financial incentive would have a noticeable effect
on the medical decisions of physicians and when a financial
incentive would raise concern about the appropriateness of
physician judgment. 128 The researchers found that, if a finan-
125. Daniel J.B. Mitchell et al., Alternative Pay Systems, Firm Performance, and
Productivity, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 15, 64-68 (Alan
S. Blinder ed., 1990).
126. Martin L. Weitzman & Douglas L. Kruse, Profit Sharing and Productivity, in
PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 95, 113-14 (Alan S. Blinder ed.,
1990); see Mitchell, supra note 125, at 69-70.
127. Mitchell, supra note 125, at 69.
128. Alan L. Hilman et al., HMO Managers' Views on Financial Incentives and
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cial incentive would account for no more than five percent of a
physician's income, only about five percent of managers felt
that the incentive posed concerns, and only about five percent
felt the incentive would have a noticeable effect on physician
behavior.' If the financial incentive were raised to as much
as fifteen percent of a physician's income, then still only about
fifteen percent of managers were concerned, but roughly half of
the managers felt that the incentive would affect physician
behavior.' If the incentive were as much as thirty percent of
a physician's income, more than eighty percent of the managers
felt the incentives would affect physician behavior, but about
half were also concerned about the appropriateness of physician
judgment.'3 ' If incentives were more than thirty percent of a
physician's income, eighty-eight percent of the managers felt the
incentives would affect physician behavior, but fully ninety-one
percent of managers were concerned about the appropriateness
of physician judgment.'32 From these data, it appears that fi-
nancial incentives for physicians should be somewhere in the
fifteen to thirty percent range; anything less would probably not
be strong enough to ensure adequate cost consciousness by
physicians, and anything larger would pose an undue risk to
patient welfare. Other data suggest that the range for financial
incentives should be narrowed somewhat to twenty to thirty
percent. In particular, it is generally believed that, in private
industry, the highest potential bonus for a worker must be at
least twenty percent of the worker's salary to provide sufficient
motivation for high performance.'33 Whether incentives are in
Quality, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1991, at 207, 208-13 (1991) (surveying 44% of HMO
managers nationwide).
129. Id. at 212.
130. Id.
131. Id-
132. Id. Since the incentive levels were presented only in terms of ranges to the
managers who were surveyed, we do not know how the managers would have re-
sponded to incentive levels between 15-30%. We only know their responses to incen-
tives that were (a) less than 5% (b) less than 15% (c) less than 30% or (d) more
than 30%. Id.
133. MITCHELL LOKmC, PRODUCTVITY AND INCENTIVES 175 (1977); RICHARD C.
SMYTH, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR MANAGEMENT 92-93 (1960). Some experts believe
that the maximum potential bonus should be 35% or more of salary. H. K. VON
KAAS, MAKING WAGE INCENTIVES WORK 7 (1971); Jay R. Schuster & Patricia L
Zingheim, Designing Incentives for Top Financial Performance, COMPENSATION & BEN-
EFITS REV., May-June 1986, at 39, 44.
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the fifteen to thirty percent or twenty to thirty percent range,
they would fall within the range of incentives permitted by the
rules of the Department of Health and Human Services."
While these incentive ranges are based on rather flimsy data
and on workers who might respond to financial incentives dif-
ferently than physicians, the ranges do comport with a general
intuitive sense of what would be appropriate. Incentives in the
five to ten percent range are likely too small to have the de-
sired impact;3 ' incentives that are in the range of a third of
income or more seem to present too great a risk of harm. Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that the available data are not as strong as
a basis for making policy in this area should be. It is critical
that further research be undertaken to give us a better sense of
the appropriate range for financial incentives."6
Applying a range of fifteen to thirty percent to different
kinds of payment plans would yield the following results. First,
assume that a plan pays physicians by salary or by a capitation
fee, and the capitation fee is designed to cover only the
physician's direct services. To discourage overutilization of ancil-
lary services, the plan withholds a portion of the physician's
salary or capitation fees until the end of year, at which time
the plan would return none, some or all of the withheld fees.
The withheld fees should amount to fifteen to thirty percent of
the physician's salary or capitation. Second, assume the plan
pays by salary or capitation as in the first case, but uses a
bonus arrangement to discourage overutilization of ancillary
services. With this scenario, the bonus range should be fifteen
to thirty percent of the sum of the physician's salary or capita-
tion and the maximum possible bonus. As these examples sug-
gest, physicians could not accept a global capitation fee de-
134. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
135. See Hall, supra note 1, at 773-774 (noting that incentives of 10% or even 20%
are not likely to compromise care since they are similar to the amounts written off
as bad debts or sacrificed through negotiated discounts by physicians as a routine
matter).
136. It would be useful to conduct a study in which some physicians had an incen-
tive of 10% of income, others an incentive of 15%, a third group an incentive of 20%,
a fourth group an incentive of 25%, and a fifth group an incentive of 30%. Re-
searchers could measure the extent to which the different physicians limited health
care expenditures for their patients and whether the cost reductions were accompa-
nied by the inappropriate withholding of care.
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signed to cover both their direct services and ancillary services
unless stop-loss protection existed to prevent patient costs from
consuming too much of the capitation fees: the stop-loss protec-
tion would have to ensure that no more than fifteen to thirty
percent of the physician's income was at risk.
In addition to limiting the amount of income that could be at
risk to be between fifteen and thirty percent, health care plans
should take other steps to protect patient welfare. First, it is
preferable to calculate incentive payments on an annual basis
rather than more frequently. Since health care costs of a
physician's patients will fluctuate from month-to-month, fre-
quent incentive payments may result in physicians taking too
short-term a view and conserving too much on resources when
they are faced with a patient whose costs of care are very
high. 3 ' Second, health care plans should ensure that the
physician's incentive payments are based on the costs of a large
enough group of patients. 8' With small groups of patients, it
is possible to have a group whose costs are well below or well
above average costs. However, financial incentives to limit care
work on the assumption that a physician faces average costs
overall and that the physician's high-cost patients are balanced
by low-cost patients. If some physicians had patients requiring
above average costs, it would not be possible for the physician
to provide adequate care and realize an incentive payment.'39
Health plans can ensure that incentive payments are based on
a large enough patient group by using incentive payments only
when the physician's practice size reaches a threshold level'
or by basing incentive payments on the cost performance of
groups of physicians where the different physicians' practices
together exceed the threshold level.' It is not clear how high
137. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PAYMENTS BY PRE-
PAID HEALTH PLANS CoULD LOWER QUALITY OF CARE 25-27 (December 1988).
138. Id. at 25-26.
139. This issue is of particular concern when health plans pay physicians a capita-
tion fee designed to cover all patient health care costs and there is no stop-loss pro-
tection. In other cases, when there are limits on the amount of a physician's income
that is placed at risk, the size of the physician's practice is a less critical factor.
140. To be precise, the relevant number is the number of patients who are covered
by the health plan's incentive arrangement, not the total number of patients in the
physician's practice. One physician may have capitation arrangements with several
insurers, and each arrangement must be viewed separately.
141. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 137, at 25.
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the threshold level must be.' Third, there should be some
financial penalties for inappropriate care. While it is not possi-
ble to link financial incentives solely to quality of care,' it is
important to ensure that physicians do not respond to financial
incentives by skimping on necessary care. Accordingly, health
care plans should routinely audit their physicians' care and
reduce a physician's incentive payment if the physician delivers
insufficient care. The lower the quality of care, the greater the
reduction in payment.'TM
It is important to note that, in addition to placing limits on
the amount of risk that can be shifted to physicians, other
safeguards already exist to protect patients from being harmed
by financial incentives. First, it is possible that financial incen-
tives to limit care will lead to care with fewer rather than more
complications. As discussed above,' if physicians are penal-
ized for high health care costs, they are more likely to try to
prevent high costs from materializing by treating patients ag-
gressively and delivering preventive and therapeutic services as
early as possible. Second, the threat of malpractice liability
provides a strong deterrent to the withholding of necessary
care. Physicians already are prone to practice defensive medi-
cine-their perception of the risk of a malpractice lawsuit is
approximately three times the actual risk of suit.4 ' Hospitals
and health care plans are also at risk from physician malprac-
142. Id. at 26. With global capitation fees, commentators seem to believe that
there must be at least 5,000 to 10,000 patients in the capitation pool to ensure a
representative patient group. See SORBO, supra note 28, at 3; Terry, supra note 21, at
32. Under the federal government's rules, a threshold of 25,000 patients was chosen.
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. However, as I have indicated, my view
does not allow for global capitation fees.
143. See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
144. One industrial company has adopted a model incentive plan in which workers
are paid based on how much they actually produce, but shoddy workmanship has
been kept low through several measures. Workers must rework faulty products on
their own time; if the quality control department catches a defect before it leaves the
plant, the worker loses bonus points; and if a defective product reaches a customer,
the worker loses even more bonus points. The company has kept its cost of returned
goods to less than 0.3% of overall costs for the past 50 years. Kenneth Chilton, Lin-
coln Electric's Incentive System: Can It Be Transferred Overseas?, COMPENSATION &
BENEFITS REV., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 21, 23.
145. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
146. Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians' Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued, 17
J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 463 (1992) (surveying a random sample of 1800 New
York state physicians with a 40% response rate).
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tice and therefore have strong incentives to monitor quality of
care and ensure that appropriate care is not withheld by phy-
sicians. As a corollary, it is important that tort reforms not be
enacted to diminish the deterrence of malpractice liability. In a
fee-for-service system in which physicians already have finan-
cial incentives to overutilize care, concerns about avoiding lia-
bility ("defensive medicine") can easily aggravate the situation
and accelerate the increase in costs. The threat of malpractice
liability can therefore be counterproductive. However, when
physicians have financial incentives to limit care, they will
likely eliminate tests and procedures that serve no medical
benefit but are done only for defensive reasons. Accordingly,
much of the concerns about the tort system's effect on
physicians' practices are not an issue under managed care,
while the benefits of deterrence become more important.
V. CONCLUSION
While financial incentives to limit care raise clear ethical
concerns, they provide important benefits that are difficult to
realize with alternative approaches to cost containment.
Physicians ultimately must assume responsibility for cost
containment, and they will do so only if they are given financial
incentives or are forced to incorporate cost considerations into
their decision-making. Resource caps can force physicians to
incorporate cost considerations, but caps on specific services
prevent physicians from individualizing patient care. Overall
budget caps are an alternative that preserves the physician's
ability to individualize care. However, there may not be a suffi-
cient incentive to contain costs from such caps. Moderate finan-
cial incentives have the virtue of constantly encouraging cost
consciousness by physicians while also permitting physicians
broad discretion to individualize the care they provide their
patients. As long as the level of incentives is not allowed to
become too high and there are other safeguards to protect
patient welfare, financial incentives can serve an important role
in cost containment.
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